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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Disputes about whether workers are properly classified 
as employees or independent contractors are a classic and 
reoccurring issue in American law. This case presents such a 
dispute. Jani-King,1 the world’s largest commercial cleaning 
franchisor, classifies its franchisees as independent 
contractors. Two Jani-King franchisees, Darryl Williams and 
Howard Brooks, assert that they are misclassified and should 
be treated as employees. On behalf of a class of Jani-King 
franchisees in the Philadelphia area, Brooks and Williams 
seek unpaid wages under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment 
and Collection Law (WPCL), 43 Pa. Stat. §§ 260.1–260.12. 
The District Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for class 
certification. In this interlocutory appeal under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(f ), we consider whether the 
misclassification claim can be made on a class-wide basis 
through common evidence, primarily the franchise agreement 
and manuals. We hold that the claims in this case are 
susceptible to class-wide determination and that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by certifying the class. 
                                              
1.  The defendants are three corporate entities: Jani-King of 
Philadelphia, Inc.; Jani-King, Inc.; and Jani-King 
International, Inc. The parties refer to these related 
corporations as “Jani-King,” and we adopt that 
convention in this opinion. 
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I 
A 
Jani-King franchisees provide janitorial and other 
cleaning services for offices, restaurants, warehouses, and 
other commercial properties. Jani-King licenses its 
trademarks, goodwill, and cleaning system to its franchisees 
and provides franchisees with administrative, billing, and 
advertising support. To obtain a franchise, an individual must 
pass a background check, pay Jani-King an initial franchise 
fee of between $14,625 and $142,750, and sign the Jani-King 
franchise agreement. (App. 108–10.) 
Jani-King requires new franchisees to meet several 
requirements before starting operations. A new franchisee 
must attend a 13-day training course and pass a test about 
Jani-King’s safety and training manual, which is more than 
450 pages long. A franchisee must also purchase cleaning 
equipment and insurance, both of which are offered directly 
by Jani-King, although a franchisee may select alternative 
sources. A franchisee must secure any needed licenses and 
permits. 
Jani-King guarantees new franchisees a certain dollar 
amount in cleaning contracts for a set period. For a larger 
initial investment, Jani-King offers contracts with higher 
value and guarantees them for a longer period. Jani-King is 
responsible for obtaining new customers, and someone from 
Jani-King’s sales office will meet with prospective customers 
to determine their cleaning needs and give them a quote. If a 
customer agrees to a cleaning services contract, the contract is 
between the customer and Jani-King. The franchisee is not a 
party. Jani-King asks franchisees whether they want to 
provide services under the contract. A franchisee may accept 
or reject the contract. 
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Jani-King exercises a significant amount of control over 
how franchisees operate. The Jani-King policies and 
procedures manual dictates when and how frequently 
franchisees must communicate with customers, how 
franchisees must dress when meeting customers, and what 
uniforms must be worn while performing cleaning work. 
(App. 9.) Franchisees must be able to respond to any 
messages within four hours at all times and must notify Jani-
King in advance of any vacations and delegate all business 
decision-making authority to someone else while on vacation. 
(App. 9.) Any marketing materials must be approved by the 
Jani-King regional office, and franchisees are not permitted to 
advertise their individual phone numbers or have individual 
websites. (App. 11.) Franchisees must make a monthly report 
to Jani-King of all services and supplies invoiced and must 
keep accurate books and records, which Jani-King may audit. 
(App. 9.) Jani-King requires franchisees to maintain sufficient 
working capital. (App. 9.) Jani-King requires franchisees to 
perform cleaning services adequately and may inspect the 
premises serviced by the franchisee at any time. (App. 9–10.) 
Customer complaints must be handled in a prescribed manner 
and within a certain time frame. 
Jani-King has numerous tools to ensure franchisees 
adhere to its requirements. Jani-King may charge a $50 
complaint fee for failure to adequately address customer 
concerns. If the complaint is serious enough, the Jani-King 
regional office will address the problem and bill the 
franchisee for any response work it must do. (App. 10.) Jani-
King may require franchisees to take remedial training. (App. 
7.) Jani-King may reassign customer accounts for inadequate 
performance or failure to adhere to policies and procedures. 
(App. 10.) Ultimately, Jani-King may suspend any franchisee 
for failure to comply with its procedures and policies.  
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Jani-King invoices customers and controls billing and 
accounting.  Jani-King subtracts all fees from the gross 
revenue and pays the remainder to the franchisee. The fees 
include a 10 percent royalty fee, a 2.5 percent accounting fee 
(although this fee is reduced for particularly large franchises), 
a 1.5 percent technology licensing fee, and a 1 percent 
advertising fee. (App. 111–12.) In addition, once the initial 
guaranteed business period expires, franchisees pay a finder’s 
fee to Jani-King for all new customer accounts. Franchisees 
may solicit new business within certain parameters, but any 
new cleaning contract is between the customer and Jani-King, 
which then has sole control over the contract. (App. 7, 11.) 
Franchisees have control over certain aspects of their 
business. While some franchisees do all cleaning work 
personally, others hire employees. Jani-King requires 
franchisees to keep certain employee documents and records, 
but franchisees otherwise have total control over hiring and 
firing employees. 
There are approximately 300 Jani-King franchises in the 
Philadelphia area. The named plaintiffs, Darryl Williams and 
Howard Brooks, purchased Jani-King franchises in the 
Philadelphia area. Williams’s and Brooks’s franchises were 
small. Brooks never hired any employees and performed 
cleaning services for his franchise himself, with occasional 
help from his wife or friends. (App. 553.) Williams services 
one Jani-King account and performs the cleaning himself, 
although he paid an employee to help him for two months at 
one point. (App. 653.) 
Franchisees have a wide range of business sizes—some 
have large businesses and many employees, and some have 
small businesses and no employees. For example, franchisee 
Charles Jones has 27 employees, including five supervisors, 
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monthly gross revenue of $43,497.39 in February 2013, and 
total gross revenue since 2009 of $1.28 million. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, Kadri Memedoski has no 
employees, $4,556.44 in monthly revenue for February 2013, 
and $500,000 total gross revenue since 2006. Jani-King 
presented other examples of franchisees with many 
employees, including Sulejuman Smanovski with 35 and 
Althea Lanier with 16. (App. 701–21.) 
B 
Williams and Brooks2 filed suit on behalf of a class of 
about 300 Jani-King franchisees in the Philadelphia area in 
state court in 2009, asserting that Jani-King violated the 
WPCL. Jani-King removed the case to the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and moved to dismiss. 
For reasons unclear from the record, it took the District Court 
three years to rule on the motion to dismiss, which it 
eventually granted in part and denied in part in December 
2012. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, 
which the District Court granted. Jani-King petitioned our 
Court for leave to appeal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(f ), and we granted permission for this appeal. 
The District Court stayed the case pending the outcome of 
this appeal. 
                                              
2.  Brooks was substituted for one of the original plaintiffs 
in 2013. 
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II3 
Class certification is appropriate when the prerequisites 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are met.4 The party 
                                              
3. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(e) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f ).  
4.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) sets forth four 
prerequisites for a class action: “(1) the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; 
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.” Rule 23(b) 
organizes class actions into three types, of which only 
one is relevant in this case:  
(3) the court finds that the questions of 
law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods 
for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy. The 
matters pertinent to these findings 
include: 
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seeking certification must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that each of the four conditions of Rule 23(a)— 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy—is met 
and that at least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b) is 
satisfied. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 
(2013). We review a district court’s class certification order 
for abuse of discretion. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008). A district court 
abuses its discretion if its decision “rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
improper application of law to fact.” Id. (quoting Newton v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 
165 (3d Cir. 2001)).  
                                                                                                     
(A) the class members’ interests 
in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of 
separate actions; 
(B)  the extent and nature of any 
litigation concerning the 
controversy already begun by 
or against class members; 
(C) the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrat-
ing the litigation of the claims 
in the particular forum; and 
(D)  the likely difficulties in 
managing a class action. 
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The District Court found that each of the Rule 23(a) 
factors was met. Jani-King did not dispute numerosity before 
the District Court. It did argue to the District Court that the 
Plaintiffs failed to establish typicality and adequacy. The 
District Court explained at length why typicality and 
adequacy were satisfied (App. 12–20), and Jani-King did not 
challenge these rulings on appeal. Nor did Jani-King 
challenge the District Court’s conclusion that the superiority 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was met. 
The issue on appeal is whether the Plaintiffs’ claims are 
capable of class-wide resolution. This involves the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) and the 
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). Commonality 
requires that there be common issues of law or fact. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(a)(2). To meet the predominance requirement, these 
common issues of law or fact must predominate over issues 
affecting individual class members. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 
1432. This is a challenging standard to meet that requires the 
district court to undertake a “rigorous analysis.” Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011); see 
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432 (“If anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 
23(a).”). Predominance turns on the “nature of the evidence” 
and whether “proof of the essential elements of the cause of 
action requires individual treatment.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 
552 F.3d at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because 
of this consideration, addressing predominance “[f]requently . 
. . entail[s] some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s 
underlying claim.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.  
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III 
A 
We begin our analysis by considering the evidence 
needed to prove the Plaintiffs’ misclassification claim under 
the WPCL. The WPCL requires employers, among other 
things, to pay to employees wages and agreed-upon fringe 
benefits in a regularly scheduled manner and by lawful 
money or check and to make only lawful deductions from 
employees’ pay. 43 Pa. Stat. §§ 260.3, 260.4. The WPCL 
gives employees the right to institute a civil action to recover 
wages owed under the statute. Id. § 260.9a(a). The dispute in 
this case is whether the Plaintiffs are employees of Jani-King 
eligible to bring a suit under the WPCL or independent 
contractors not covered by the WPCL. 
The WPCL does not define “employee.” Morin v. 
Brassington, 871 A.2d 844, 849 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). In 
interpreting the meaning of employee under the WPCL, 
Pennsylvania courts have looked to similar statutes such as 
the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Act and the 
Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. Id. at 849–50 
(applying the Workers’ Compensation Act and related case 
law to the WPCL); Frank Burns, Inc. v. Interdigital 
Commc’ns Corp., 704 A.2d 678, 680 (Pa. Super Ct. 1997) 
(applying the definitions in the Unemployment Compensation 
Act and Workers’ Compensation act to the WPCL).5  
                                              
5.  In the absence of a definitive pronouncement by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court about the definition of 
“employee” under the WPCL, we must predict how that 
court would decide the issue. In doing so, “we must 
look to decisions of state intermediate appellate courts, 
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Pennsylvania courts interpreting the Unemployment 
Compensation Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act have 
applied a multifactor test to determine whether a worker is an 
employee or independent contractor. Courts interpreting the 
WPCL have adopted the same multifactor test. The factors 
include: 
the control of the manner that work is 
to be done; responsibility for result 
only; terms of agreement between the 
parties; the nature of the work or 
occupation; the skill required for 
performance; whether one employed is 
engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business; which party supplies the 
tools; whether payment is by the time 
or by the job; whether the work is part 
of the regular business of the employer, 
and the right to terminate the 
employment at any time. 
                                                                                                     
of federal courts interpreting that state’s law, and of 
other state supreme courts that have addressed the issue, 
as well as to analogous decisions, considered dicta, 
scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending 
convincingly to show how the highest court in the state 
would decide the issue at hand.” Spence v. ESAB Grp., 
Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216–17 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). We find the method of 
analysis used by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in 
Morin and Frank Burns—comparison to similar 
statutes—persuasive. 
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Morin, 871 A.2d at 850 (quoting Lynch v. Workmen’s Comp. 
Appeal Bd., 554 A.2d 159, 160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)). The 
applicability of this multifactor test to the WPCL is bolstered 
by the use of the same factors by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court to distinguish between employees and independent 
contractors in the context of vicarious liability. Hammermill 
Paper Co. v. Rust Eng’g Co., 243 A.2d 389, 392 (Pa. 1968).  
Although no factor is dispositive, the “paramount” factor 
is the right to control the manner in which the work is 
accomplished. Morin, 871 A.2d at 850. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has also noted, in the context of workers’ 
compensation, that “control over the work to be completed 
and the manner in which it is to be performed are the primary 
factors in determining employee status.” Universal Am-Can, 
Ltd. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 762 A.2d 328, 333 (Pa. 
2000) (calling these factors the “dominant considerations”); 
see Lynch, 554 A.2d at 160 (“[T]he right to control is the most 
persuasive indication of [employee or independent contractor 
status].”) 
Jani-King argues that actual control, not the right to 
control, is the key factor in the test. Jani-King criticizes a 
number of Pennsylvania lower-court decisions, including 
Lynch, and argues that they are mistaken or rely on inapposite 
borrowed-employee cases. But the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has held that the right to control is more significant 
than actual control. Universal Am-Can, 762 A.2d at 333 (“[I]t 
is the existence of the right to control that is significant, 
irrespective of whether the control is actually exercised.”). 
And we have also recognized the importance of the right to 
control. Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctrs., Inc., 582 F.2d 
781, 785 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Actual control of the manner of 
work is not essential; rather, it is the right to control which is 
determinative.”). According to Jani-King, Universal Am-Can, 
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an employee–independent contractor case, relied on 
borrowed-employee cases for this conclusion. But to the 
extent the Pennsylvania case law is premised on a “mistake,” 
that mistake is longstanding and accepted by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It is not our place to “correct” 
such a mistake. 
Pennsylvania courts, including the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, apply the multifactor test for distinguishing 
between employee and independent contractor status in many 
different contexts. Based on this authority, we predict that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would employ this test in the 
context of the WPCL. We also predict that the right to control, 
rather than actual control, is the most important of the factors. 
B 
We turn next to the more difficult question of whether, 
using the multifactor test, the employment status question can 
be resolved in this case through evidence common to the 
class. The common evidence identified by the Plaintiffs and 
the District Court are the Jani-King franchise agreement, 
policies manual, and training manual, and representative 
testimony about those documents. The District Court 
concluded that the Plaintiffs’ claims could be proven through 
this common evidence and that, therefore, the Plaintiffs met 
the predominance requirement.  
The District Court accurately summarized the controls 
placed on franchisees by the franchise agreement and 
manuals: 
Plaintiffs have pointed to specific 
provisions in the Franchise Agreement, 
the Policies Manual, and the Training 
Manual (collectively “Jani-King 
Documents”) to show that Jani-King 
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has the ability to control the manner in 
which franchisees perform their day-to-
day tasks. All the proposed class 
members are bound by the Jani-King 
Documents, which include mandates 
regarding how often the franchisee 
must communicate with customers, 
how franchisees must address customer 
complaints, where franchisees can 
solicit business, what franchisees must 
wear, what types of records the 
franchisee must keep, how the 
franchisee can advertise, how far in 
advance franchisees must inform the 
franchisor of vacations, and how 
quickly the franchisee must be able to 
be reached. In addition, Jani-King 
controls the franchisees’ work 
assignments, has the right to inspect the 
franchisees work, and has the ability to 
change the policies and procedures as it 
sees fit. 
(App. 29–30.)  
The Jani-King franchise agreement, policies manual, and 
training manual are common to the class—they apply to the 
franchisee who has no employees and services a low-value 
contract and to the franchisee with dozens of employees and 
many cleaning contracts. These documents describe the level 
of Jani-King’s right to control its franchisees. They also 
address many of the secondary factors considered in 
Pennsylvania decisions—the terms of agreement, the nature 
of the work, the skill required, who supplies the tools, 
whether payment is by time or by job, and the right to 
16 
 
terminate at any time. See Morin, 871 A.2d at 850. We find no 
legal error in the District Court’s conclusion that these 
documents “could be read” to give Jani-King the right to 
control its franchisees. (App. 30.) 
We go no further toward resolving the merits of the 
WPCL claim. Although the court must undertake a rigorous 
analysis at the certification stage and consider some merits-
related issues, the class certification stage is not the place for 
a decision on the merits. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & 
Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013) (“Rule 23 
grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits 
inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may be 
considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they 
are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites 
for class certification are satisfied.”). 
Jani-King asks us to weigh in on the merits of the 
Plaintiffs’ claim now. Jani-King’s first issue on appeal is: “Do 
the system controls inherent in a franchise relationship make 
a franchisor the employer of its franchise owners under 
Pennsylvania’s multi-factor employment test?” (Jani-King Br. 
1.) This appeal is not the proper place for us to answer this 
question, and we decline to do so. It is enough for us to 
determine that some franchise agreements may contain 
sufficient controls to render the relationship one of 
employment and that the common documents in this case 
contain the types of evidence that courts and juries use to 
make that determination under Pennsylvania law.  
Jani-King may ultimately be correct that the franchise 
agreement and manual do not contain sufficient controls over 
the day-to-day work of its franchisees to make them 
employees under Pennsylvania law, and we express no 
opinion on that matter here. Either way, it is possible to make 
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the determination on a class-wide basis. If Jani-King is 
correct and the documents cannot, as a matter of fact, 
establish that the franchisees are employees, Jani-King will 
prevail class wide. 
C 
Jani-King makes two primary arguments for why the 
franchise agreement and manual are insufficient to resolve the 
WPCL claim. One, Jani-King argues that, as a matter of law, 
written agreements alone are insufficient to determine 
employment status. And, two, Jani-King argues that 
franchises are inherently different from other types of 
business relationships and that franchise system controls 
should be categorically excluded from consideration when 
determining whether an employment relationship exists. 
Neither of these arguments persuades us that certifying the 
class was an abuse of discretion. 
1 
Jani-King asserts that the test for employee status under 
Pennsylvania law is not susceptible to proof through common 
evidence. This is so, according to Jani-King, because “the 
entire employment relationship must be examined in 
determining whether it is an employment relationship.” C E 
Credits OnLine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 946 
A.2d 1162, 1168 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008). Jani-King notes 
that “courts have repeatedly held that examining the written 
terms of an agreement alone is not sufficient to determine 
employment status.” (Jani-King Br. 19.) Therefore, Jani-King 
argues, the district court erred as a matter of law “[b]y relying 
on the terms of Jani-King’s common franchise documents, to 
the exclusion of individual evidence of the actual 
relationships between Jani-King and” franchisees. (Id. at 20.) 
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We are not convinced that the terms of a written 
agreement alone are never sufficient to determine 
employment status. Jani-King cited Urbano v. STAT Courier, 
Inc., 878 A.2d 58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), a class action WPCL 
case in which the plaintiff delivery drivers argued they were 
misclassified. In that case, the Superior Court stated that, 
“[w]hile [an] agreement [is] relevant when identifying 
whether an employee/employer relationship exists, it is just 
one of the criteria to be utilized.” Id. at 62. The trial court had 
granted judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiffs 
were independent contractors as a matter of law because the 
driver agreement repeatedly identified drivers as independent 
contractors. But the Superior Court reversed because there 
were disputed facts that the alleged employer exercised 
control to a greater degree than provided by the agreement. 
Id. In this case, there is no assertion that the agreement and 
manuals do not control. 
We are equally unpersuaded by two other cases relied 
upon by Jani-King, Jones v. Century Oil U.S.A., Inc., 957 
F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1992), and Kurbatov v. Department of Labor 
& Industry, 29 A.3d 66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011). Jani-King cited 
Jones for its statement that “it is the actual practice between 
the parties that is crucial.” Jones, 957 F.2d at 87 (quoting 
George v. Nemeth, 233 A.2d 231, 233 (Pa. 1967)). Kurbatov 
similarly held that it is the “actual working relationship 
between worker and employer” that is determinative. 29 A.3d 
at 70. But in both these cases, the courts were responding to 
an argument by the defendant that the worker was an 
independent contractor because the agreement identified the 
worker as an independent contractor. Jones, 957 F.2d at 87; 
Kurbatov, 29 A.3d at 70. These courts were contrasting the 
“actual practice” and “actual working relationship” against 
the labels used in an agreement. It is these labels that are not 
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determinative. Jones, 957 F.2d at 86 (“[T]he determining 
factor is not the way in which plaintiffs or defendant regards 
this relationship but ‘what it really was under the facts and 
applicable rules of law.’” (quoting Feller v. New Amsterdam 
Cas. Co., 70 A.2d 299, 302 (Pa. 1950))). 
The provisions of an agreement may be evidence of what 
the actual practice or working relationship is. In Kurbatov, for 
example, the Superior Court affirmed an order of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, which had 
determined that an employment relationship existed. The 
Department of Labor and Industry relied on the agreement, 
even though the employer’s testimony conflicted with the 
agreement. The Department of Labor and Industry was 
entitled to weigh the evidence and rely on the documentary 
evidence to the exclusion of testimony. Kurbatov, 29 A.3d at 
72. Compare this to Jones, where we vacated a directed 
verdict because there was testimony that the right to control 
was “not fully reflected in the written agreements.” Jones, 
957 F.2d at 88–89 & n.3. 
 The three decisions cited by Jani-King contrast with 
Green v. Independent Oil Co., 201 A.2d 207 (Pa. 1964). 
Green was a vicarious liability case: The defendant company 
argued it was not responsible for the negligence of a worker 
whom the company alleged was an independent contractor. 
The “sole evidence of the relationship” between the worker 
and the company was the agreement. Id. at 211. Since the 
terms of the agreement were not in dispute, the determination 
of the relationship was a question of law for the court. Id. “An 
examination of the . . . agreement in its entirety indicate[d] 
clearly and convincingly that the relationship . . . was that of 
independent contractee-contractor, not employer-employee.” 
Id. Under certain circumstances, therefore, an employment 
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relationship—or the lack of one—can be determined by 
examining the documents alone. 
Because documentary evidence can be sufficient to 
resolve the multifactor employment status test, it was not an 
error of law for the District Court to rely on this evidence in 
ruling on class certification. 
2 
Jani-King and the amicus International Franchise 
Association stress that franchising is an important and 
beneficial way of conducting business that is fundamentally 
different from other situations involving misclassification 
claims. They both assert that an adverse decision “directly 
threatens the viability of franchising in Pennsylvania.” (Jani-
King Br. 2; see Amicus Br. 23.) Jani-King argues that the 
system controls inherent in franchising should be irrelevant 
when considering whether an alleged employer has the right 
to exercise day-to-day control. 
Some case law lends credence to this position. For 
example, we have noted that “[s]ome degree of control by the 
franchisor over the franchisee would appear to be inherent in 
the franchise relationship and may even be mandated by 
federal [trademark] law.” Drexel, 582 F.2d at 786 (citation 
omitted). In Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc., 634 A.2d 
622, 627 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), for example, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court held that the franchise system controls 
imposed by Best Western “addresse[d] the result of the work 
and not the manner in which it is conducted.”  
Jani-King also cites cases from other jurisdictions, 
including a California case involving Jani-King, Juarez v. 
Jani-King of California, Inc., 273 F.R.D. 571 (N.D. Cal. 
2011). In that case, the district court found “it likely that 
under California law, a franchisee must show that the 
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franchisor exercised ‘control beyond that necessary to protect 
and maintain its interest in its trademark, trade name and 
goodwill’ to establish a prima facie case of an employer-
employee relationship.” Id. at 583 (quoting Cislaw v. 
Southland Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 394 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
Once the district court “set[] aside the policies required to 
protect Jani-King’s service mark and goodwill, [it found] very 
little—if any—common evidence tending to prove an 
employer-employee relationship between Jani-King and its 
franchisees.” Id. In the instant case, the District Court 
discounted Juarez because Pennsylvania law “does not 
distinguish between controls put in place to protect a 
franchise’s goodwill and intellectual property and controls for 
other purposes.” (App. 29.) We have found no Pennsylvania 
case holding otherwise. The District Court did not err by 
discounting Juarez. 
The Pennsylvania cases cited by Jani-King do not stand 
for the proposition that franchise system controls are 
somehow categorically excluded from consideration in the 
employee–independent contractor analysis. As we succinctly 
stated in Drexel, 
the mere existence of a franchise 
relationship does not necessarily trigger 
a master-servant relationship, nor does 
it automatically insulate the parties 
from such a relationship. Whether the 
control retained by the franchisor is 
also sufficient to establish a master-
servant relationship depends in each 
case upon the nature and extent of such 
control as defined in the franchise 
agreement or by the actual practice of 
the parties. 
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Drexel, 582 F.2d at 786. Under Pennsylvania law, no special 
treatment is accorded to the franchise relationship. A 
franchisee may be an employee or an independent contractor 
depending on the nature of the franchise system controls.  
IV 
The Plaintiffs’ WPCL misclassification claim can be 
resolved by the evidence that is common to the class. We find 
no clearly erroneous finding of fact or errant conclusion of 
law in the District Court’s judgment. We therefore conclude 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
certifying the class. We will affirm the District Court’s class 
certification order. 
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Williams, et al. v. Jani-King of Philadelphia, Inc., et al., No.  
15-2049, dissenting.   
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
Franchising constitutes “a bedrock of the American 
economy.”  Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 
124 F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 1997).  Yet the majority’s opinion 
threatens the viability of this basic economic bedrock.  I do 
not believe that such a result is consistent with either basic 
class action principles, the nature and importance of the 
franchisor-franchise relationship, or prior franchising case 
law.  I predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
ultimately hold that controls necessary to protect a 
franchisor’s trademark, trade name, and goodwill—in short, 
“franchise system controls”—are insufficient by themselves 
to establish the existence of an employer-employee 
relationship between the franchisor and its franchisees.  In 
this case, the Plaintiffs’ purported common evidence merely 
sets forth various franchise system controls.  Because of the 
absence of common evidence tending to prove that the 
franchisees are employees of the franchisor, the District Court 
abused its discretion by certifying a class of Jani-King 
franchisees.  I therefore must respectfully dissent.       
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), a 
class action may be maintained if “the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.”  The majority 
acknowledges that “[t]his is a challenging standard to meet 
that requires the district court to undertake ‘a rigorous 
analysis.’”  (Maj. Op. at 10 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)).)  In fact, predominance 
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depends on the nature of the evidence and whether proof of 
the elements of the cause of action requires individual 
treatment.  See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 
552 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2008).  “Because of this 
consideration, addressing predominance ‘[f]requently . . . 
entail[s] some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim.’  Wal-Mart, 132 S. Ct. at 2551.”  (Id. at 11.)  In short, 
we must “examine the elements of plaintiffs’ claim ‘through 
the prism’ of Rule 23 to determine whether the District Court 
properly certified the class.”  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 
311 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 181 (3d Cir. 2001)).  The district 
court should envision the form a representative trial of the 
claim will take and then conduct a rigorous assessment of the 
available evidence as well as the methods that the plaintiff 
proposes to use to prove his or her claim.  See, e.g., id. at 
311-12; Sherman v. Am. Exp., Inc., Civil Action No. 09-575, 
2012 WL 748400, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2012).      
However, the majority purportedly refuses to answer 
the basic question raised by Jani-King in its appeal—whether 
“franchise system controls” make a franchisor the employer 
of its franchisees under Pennsylvania’s multi-factor 
employment test.  Given the rigorous obligations imposed by 
Rule 23, I do not see how we could avoid addressing this 
basic question.  The predominance inquiry turns on what 
Pennsylvania law requires as evidence of employment status.  
In other words, could Plaintiffs really show that Jani-King’s 
franchisees are, in fact, its employees under Pennsylvania law 
using the Jani-King franchise agreement and other evidence 
common to the entire putative class?  If, as a matter of state 
law, controls that are necessary to protect the franchisor’s 
own trademark, trade name, and goodwill are, by themselves, 
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not sufficient to make the franchisor the employer of its own 
franchisees—and the common evidence in the record merely 
implicates such “franchise system controls,” the Court then 
must determine that Plaintiffs cannot possibly show that ‘each 
element is capable of proof through evidence that is common 
to the class,” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311.   
In any event, the majority, despite its disclaimers, 
effectively answers this basic question in the affirmative.  
After all, it addresses at some length case law considering the 
employee-independent contractor distinction under 
Pennsylvania law, including two franchising decisions:  
Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., 582 F.2d 781 (3d 
Cir. 1978), and Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc., 634 
A.2d 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  It then upheld the District 
Court’s ruling insofar as it “discounted” a class certification 
opinion involving Jani-King (Maj. Op. at 21)—which held 
that “it is likely that under California law, a franchisee must 
show that the franchisor exercised ‘control beyond that 
necessary to protect and maintain its interest in its trademark, 
trade name and goodwill’ to establish a prima facie case of an 
employer-employee relationship,” Juarez v. Jani-King of Cal., 
Inc., 273 F.R.D. 571, 583 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Cislaw v. 
Southland Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 394 (Ct. App. 1992)).  
Rejecting Juarez, the majority instead held that, “[u]nder 
Pennsylvania law, no special treatment is accorded to the 
franchise relationship” and that “[a] franchisee may be an 
employee or an independent contractor depending on the 
nature of the franchise system controls.”  (Id. at 22.)  
Obviously, this opinion will be cited as precedent (or, at the 
very least, as dicta) for the proposition that, despite the nature 
and importance of the franchisor-franchisee relationship, 
franchise system controls may by themselves give rise to an 
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employer-employee relationship under a variety of different 
statutory schemes (i.e., the WPCL, the Pennsylvania 
Unemployment Compensation Act, and the Pennsylvania 
Workers Compensation Act) as well as the doctrine of 
vicarious liability.  I further note that Jani-King now has the 
burden of defending against a class action and that this 
opinion will most likely lead to additional class action 
litigation against other franchisors.     
 It appears that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
not expressly answered the specific question of whether or 
not franchise system controls are sufficient by themselves to 
establish the existence of an employer-employee relationship 
between the franchisor and the franchisees.  Given the nature 
and importance of the franchisor-franchisee relationship, 
existing Pennsylvania case law like Drexel and Myszkowski, 
and franchising cases from other jurisdictions, I predict that 
the state supreme court would answer this question in the 
negative.1 
                                              
1 Like the majority, I look, in the absence of state 
supreme court precedent directly on point, to “‘decisions of 
state intermediate appellate courts, of federal courts 
interpreting that state’s law, and of other state supreme courts 
that have addressed the issue,’ as well as to ‘analogous 
decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other 
reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest 
court in the state would decide the issue at hand.’”  Spence v. 
ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216-17 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Norfolk So. Ry. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 92 
(3d Cir. 2008)).    
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 Franchise system controls constitute an essential 
aspect of the franchising mechanism.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has recognized that “‘the franchise has 
evolved into an elaborate agreement by which the franchisee 
undertakes to conduct a business or sell a product or service 
in accordance with methods and procedures prescribed by the 
franchisor, and the franchisor undertakes to assist the 
franchisee through advertising, promotion and other advisory 
services.’”  Atl. Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 740 
(Pa. 1978) (quoting Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, 351 
A.2d 207, 211 (Pa. 1976)).  The franchisor’s basic product is 
the “franchise itself.”  Piercing Pagoda, 351 A.2d at 211 
(citations omitted).  Product uniformity and quality control 
attract customers and are critical to the success of both the 
franchisees as well as the franchisor.  See, e.g., Queen City 
Pizza, 124 F.3d at 433; Piercing Pagoda, 124 F.3d at 211.  In 
fact, a “trademark owner risks losing his rights” by failing to 
maintain adequate control over “the quality of his licensees’ 
products.”  Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 
1211, 1216 n.6 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127).   
 This franchisor-franchisee relationship thereby offers 
several important advantages to franchisors and franchisees 
alike.  For example, the franchisee may benefit from existing 
inventory, training, and directions for market development, 
and, in addition, the creation and maintenance of goodwill 
through strict system controls should help to bring in more 
customers for the franchisee.  See, e.g., id. at 1222-23; 
Piercing Pagoda, 351 A.2d at 211-12.   
 Given these characteristics, it is not surprising that the 
franchising sector represents a major component of the 
economy.  Nationally, this sector employs millions of people, 
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has payrolls in the billions, and generate trillions of dollars in 
total sales.  See, e.g.¸ Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 333 
P.3d 723, 733 (Cal. 2014).  Amicus International Franchise 
Association estimates that, in 2007, Pennsylvania had 29,514 
franchise establishments, with a total payroll of $10.7 billion 
and more than $82.4 billion in output. 
 As the majority admits, we stated in Drexel that 
“‘[s]ome degree of control by the franchisor over the 
franchisee would appear to be inherent in the franchise 
relationship and may even be mandated by federal 
[trademark] law.’”  (Maj. Op. at 20 (quoting Drexel, 582 F.2d 
at 786).)  While the Drexel Court then ruled that the district 
court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of a drug 
store franchisor, we did so because, among other things, the 
agreement at issue was so broadly drafted “as to render 
uncertain the precise nature and scope of [the franchisor’s] 
rights vis-à-vis its franchisee.”  Drexel, 582 F.2d at 788.  We 
even assumed that the franchisor’s right to control various 
facets of the franchisee’s operations—ranging from the 
appearance and contents of the franchisee’s store to the color 
of its delivery trucks—implicated the franchisor’s interest in 
the result of the work as opposed to the manner in which the 
franchisee operated.  Id.  After all, “‘[t]he hallmark of an 
employee-employer relationship is that the employer not only 
controls the result of the work but has the right to direct the 
manner in which the work shall be accomplished; the 
hallmark of an independent contractee-contractor relationship 
is that the person engaged in the work has the exclusive 
control of the manner of performing it, being responsible only 
for the result.’”  Id. at 785 (quoting Green v. Indep. Oil Co., 
201 A.2d 207, 210 (Pa. 1964)).   
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 More recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
determined that summary judgment was properly granted in 
favor of a hotel marketing organization sued by an individual 
who had been sexually assaulted by a third party in one of its 
affiliated hotels.  Myszkowski, 634 A.2d at 623-30.  
According to Myszkowski, “the owners of [the hotel] 
managed the day-to-day operations of the business and made 
all the decisions incidental to this operation.”  Id. at 626-27.  
Expressly distinguishing Drexel on the grounds that the 
franchise agreement was so broadly written as to give the 
drug store franchisor the power to impose virtually anything it 
desired, id. at 628 n.6, the state appellate court concluded that 
“the fact that [the organization] sets certain standards in order 
to maintain a uniform quality of inn service only addresses 
the result of the work and not the manner in which it is 
conducted.”  Id. at 627; see also, e.g., Smith v. Exxon Corp., 
647 A.2d 577, 582 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (“As in 
Myszkowski, here, the standards were implemented to 
maintain a uniform quality of service.”).  In reaching this 
conclusion, it thereby took into account the nature of the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship, indicating that a franchise 
represents “‘a uniform system of inn service—that carried 
with it an obligation to maintain certain standards prescribed 
by the seller.’”  Myszkowski, 634 A.2d at 627-28 (quoting 
Schear v, Motel Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 487 A.2d 1240, 1249 
(Md. 1985)); see also, e.g., id. at 628 (“‘The general purpose 
of the contract is the maintenance of uniform service within, 
and public good toward, the Ramada Inn system.’” (quoting 
Hayman v. Ramada Inn, 357 S.E.2d 394, 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1987))). 
 In fact, Myszkowski relied on a similar ruling by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  In Green v. Independent Oil 
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Co., 201 A.2d 207 (Pa. 1964), an oil company was named as 
a defendant in litigation arising out of a deadly explosion at 
one of its dealer stations, id. at 208-09.  According to the state 
supreme court, the trial court erred in submitting the question 
of whether there was an employer-employee relationship 
between the oil company and the dealer to the jury.  Id. at 
210-11.  As the Pennsylvania Superior Court aptly explained, 
several considerations were “[s]ignificant” to the outcome in 
Green:  (1) the agreement between the parties specifically 
disclaimed the existence of any agency relationship; (2) all 
profits went to the dealer; (3) the sales tax permits and 
electric bills were in the dealer’s name; (4) the dealer hired, 
fired, and paid his own employees; (5) all monies were kept 
by the dealer in the dealer’s personal bank account; and (6) 
the dealer purchased the oil company’s products.  
Myszkowski, 634 A.2d at 626 (citing Green, 201 A.2d at 210) 
(footnote omitted).             
 Accordingly, “[s]ome case law lend credence” to the 
line of reasoning offered by Jani King (and the amicus).  
(Maj. Op. at 20.)  As I have already noted, the Juarez court 
recently held that, under California law, a franchisee must 
show that the franchisor (Jani-King itself) exercised “‘control 
beyond that necessary to protect and maintain its interest in 
its trademark, trade name and goodwill.’”  Juarez, 273 F.R.D. 
at 583 (quoting Cislaw, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394).  “As such, the 
Court can safely exclude from the employee-employer 
relationship analysis facts that merely show the common 
hallmarks of a franchise.’”  Id.  Subsequently, the California 
Supreme Court essentially adopted the Juarez approach.  It 
concluded that a franchisor will be held vicariously liable 
“only if it has retained or assumed a general right of control 
over factors such as hiring, direction, discipline, discharge, 
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and relevant day-to-day aspects of the workplace behavior of 
the franchisee’s employees.”  Patterson, 333 P.3d at 739 
(footnote omitted).  The Maine Supreme Judicial Court and 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court have reached similar 
conclusions.  See Rainey v. Langen, 998 A.2d 342, 347 (Me. 
2010) (“[C]ourts commonly distinguish between control over 
a franchisee’s day-to-day operations and ‘controls designed 
primarily to insure “uniformity and the standardization of 
products and services.”’” (citation omitted))); Kerl v. Dennis 
Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Wis. 2004) 
(concluding that “the marketing, quality and operational 
standards commonly found in franchise agreements are 
insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a master/servant 
relationship for all purposes or as a general matter”).                     
Under these circumstances, the District Court was 
wrong to conclude that Pennsylvania law “does not 
distinguish between controls put in place to protect a 
franchise’s goodwill and intellectual property and controls for 
other purposes.”  Myers v. Jani-King of Philadelphia, Inc., 
Civil Action No. 09-1738, 2015 WL 1055700, at *14 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 11, 2015).  Neither the District Court nor the 
majority cites to any case law expressly refusing to draw such 
a distinction.  On the contrary, the existing Pennsylvania case 
law weighs in favor of distinguishing controls “inherent in the 
franchise relationship,” Drexel, 582 F.2d at 786 (citation 
omitted).  After all, such a distinction is consistent with the 
fundamental and well-established notion that, while an 
employer has the right to direct the manner of performance, 
an independent contractee merely has the right to control the 
result of the work.  See, e.g., Rainey, 998 A.2d at 349 (“The 
traditional test allows a franchisor to regulate the uniformity 
and the standardization of products and services without 
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risking the imposition of vicarious liability.  If a franchisor 
takes further measures to reserve control over a franchisee’s 
performance of its day-to-day operations, however, the 
franchisor is no longer merely protecting its mark, and 
imposing vicarious liability may be appropriate.’” (citing, 
inter alia, Drexel, 582 F.2d at 786)); Myszkowski, 634 A.2d 
at 627 (explaining that fact hotel marketing organization set 
certain standards to maintain uniform service quality 
implicated “the result of the work and not the manner in 
which it is conducted”).  I further note that California—like 
Pennsylvania—treats the right to control as the most 
important factor in a multi-factor employment inquiry.2  See, 
e.g., Juarez, 273 F.R.D. at 581. 
I ultimately conclude that Pennsylvania’s highest court 
would not allow “the very thing that defines [franchising]—
                                              
2  I do question whether, in these circumstances, the 
existence of an employment relationship can really be 
determined based solely on documentary evidence.  After all, 
Pennsylvania law mandates a multi-factor test requiring the 
courts to examine “the entire employment relationship.”  C E 
Credits v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 946 A.2d 
1162, 1168 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (citing Beacon Flag Car 
Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 910 A.2d 103, 
108 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006)).  “[N]o one factor is dispositive 
of one’s status and . . . each case must be determined on its 
own facts.”  Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 522 A.2d 43, 45 
(Pa. 1987).  Even if it is typically the alleged employee who 
offers evidence of actual control or performance, I fail to see 
why such evidence may not also weigh in favor of the 
putative employer in certain circumstances under what is a 
rather open-ended inquiry.      
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the ‘uniformity of product and control of its quality and 
distribution’”—to be used to put at risk this critical and 
generally beneficial sector of our economy (Appellants’ 
Reply Brief at 1-2 (quoting Atl. Richfield, 390 A.2d at 740)).  
See, e.g., Patterson, 333 P.3d at 726 (“Analysis of the 
franchise relationship for vicarious liability purposes must 
accommodate these contemporary realities.  The imposition 
and enforcement of a uniform marketing and operational plan 
cannot automatically saddle the franchisor with responsibility 
for employees of the franchisee who injure each other on the 
job.”).  In turn, the approach I set out here does not grant 
franchisors any sort of immunity from either possible 
vicarious liability or generally applicable employment laws 
like the WPCL.  Unlike Jani-King, I do not believe that 
franchise system controls are simply irrelevant to the 
employment inquiry.  Instead, such controls are insufficient 
by themselves to establish the existence of an employer-
employee relationship.  The inquiry thereby must go beyond 
the mere use of labels like “franchisor” and “franchisee” and 
assess whether the controls at issue exceed what is necessary 
to protect a franchisor’s trademark, trade name, or goodwill.  
See, e.g., Drexel, 582 F.2d at 786 (“[T]he mere existence of a 
franchise relationship does not necessarily trigger a master-
servant relationship, nor does it automatically insulate the 
parties from such a relationship.  Whether the control retained 
by the franchisor is also sufficient to establish a master-
servant relationship depends in each case upon the nature and 
extent of such control as defined in the franchise agreement 
or by the actual practice of the parties.” (citations omitted)). 
Applying this approach, the next step is to consider the 
purported common evidence offered by Plaintiffs and identify 
the various policies that constitute controls instituted as 
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necessary to protect the franchisor’s own trademark, trade 
name, and goodwill.  Jani-King provides an especially 
thorough—and persuasive—explanation for why “each of the 
contractual provisions and policies identified by the district 
court is simply an example of a common franchise system 
control, not a manifestation of the type of day-to-day 
supervisory control that indicates an employment 
relationship.”  (Appellants’ Brief at 38.)  To give just one 
example, it appropriately notes that, while the District Court 
pointed to Jani-King’s right to dictate what the franchisees 
must wear on the job, such uniform requirements are 
generally considered necessary to protect the goodwill 
associated with the franchise brand.  See, e.g., Kerl, 682 
N.W.2d at 341 (“The agreement specifies standards regarding 
containers, uniforms, paper goods, and other packaging 
supplies.”).  Admittedly, Jani-King does appear to possess a 
great deal of power, especially with respect to customer 
negotiations, account assignments, and billing.  Specifically, 
the franchisor negotiates and contracts with a prospective 
customer and then offers this contract to the respective 
franchisee (which is not a contractual party itself).  Jani-King 
likewise invoices customers and controls billing and 
accounting.  In contrast, it was the hotel in Myszkowski (and 
not the marketing organization) that set its own prices.  
Myszkowski, 534 A.2d at 627.  Nevertheless, “[a] franchisee 
may accept or reject the contract” (Maj. Op. at 5), and they 
“may solicit new business within certain parameters” (id. at 
6).  See, e.g., Applied Measurement Prof’ls, Inc. v. 
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 844 A.2d 632, 636 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (finding that worker was independent 
contractor because, inter alia, she was “free to accept or reject 
an assignment”).  While Jani-King sets certain quality 
standards, it appears that the franchisor does not specify the 
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specific methods the franchisees must utilize to perform the 
cleaning work.  Finally, although Jani-King requires its 
franchisees to keep certain employment records, “franchisees 
otherwise have total control over hiring and firing 
employees” (id. at 7).  See, e.g., Myszkowski, 634 A.2d at 
627 (noting that hotel hired, fired, paid, and supervised its 
own employees). 
“Once [we] set[ ] aside the policies required to protect 
Jani-King’s service mark and goodwill, [there appears to be] 
very little—if any—common evidence tending to prove an 
employer-employee relationship between Jani-King and its 
franchisees.”  Juarez, 372 F.R.D. at 583.  In fact, the record is 
replete with individual evidence—franchisees vary widely in 
size ranging from small operations consisting of merely the 
individual franchisee to million-dollar enterprises with 
multiple employees.  Accordingly, the District Court clearly 
committed reversible error by finding that common questions 
of law and fact predominate over individual ones.   
For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the class 
certification order and remand for further proceedings on an 
individual (non-class action) basis. 
